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Judicial Elections, Campaign Financing, and Free Speech
RONALD D. ROTUNDA
(39 at last count) choose judges
through popular elections 1 But these
elections are often quite unlike ordinary political campaigns. When judges run for reelection,
or when lawyers run for judicial office, they are
typicalJy subject to rules that limit what they
can say in the course of their campaigns. 2 The
incumbent judges issue rules that are both intended to restrict, and in fact do severely restrict, the political speech of judicial candidates
running for office. These rules are "law" in the
same sense that rules of evidence or rules of
civil procedure are law,3 so one should not
think of such rules as advisory. They have real
bite, and those who violate them are subject to

discipline, which can range up to loss of judicial office (if one is a judge) or disbarment (if
one is a lawyer running for judge).
States typically justify these stringent and
rigid restrictions on various grounds, all of
which are a subset of a general notion that judging is not politics and that, therefore, judges
should not campaign like politicians. tiowever,
it must be remembered that judges run for office only because the state constitution of the
particular jurisdiction mandates political campaigns. 4 States, if they choose, can avoid the
baggage associated with political campaigns
for judicial office simply by turning to merit selection of judges 5

Ronald D. Rotunda is th(: George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University School
of Law.

ment from organizations that regularly make recommendations for reappointment or appointment
to the office, and from individuals to the extent requested or required by those specified in Section
5B(2)(a); and
"(iii) provide to those specified in Sections
5B(2)(a)(i) and 5B(2)(a)(ii) iniormation as to his or
her qualifications for the office."

M

OST STATES

1 A:vrEHICAN JuDICATURE SociETY, JumciAL SELECTION r~; THE
STATES:

APPELLA1E

AND

GENER.,\L jUR!SDlCTION

COURTS

(Apr. 2002).
2 ABA MoDEL CoDE oF JuDICIAL Co""'DUCT, Canon 5A
(1990), reprinted in, THOMAS 0. -MORGAN AND RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, 2002 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RE~
SPONS!BIUTY (Foundation Press, 2002), at 758-63.
3 THOMAS D. MoRGAN AND RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIOI\TAL RESPONSIBILITY 12 (Foundation Press, ?th Ed. 2000).
4 The ABA MoDEL Com: OF JuDiciAL CoNDUCT purports to
apply to both elected and appointed judges. It is interesting that the Federal Judicial Council, which has
adopted a version of the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, explicitly did not adopt a provision of Canon 5
that explicitly addresses the solicitation of endorsem.ent
for appointment to judicial office. Canon 513(2) of the ABA
Model Code provides that:

Although the ABA's proposed Judicial Code seeks torestrict candidates for appointment to judicial office from
.seeking support from individuaLs, the drafters of the Code
of Conduct for U.S. Judges explicitly excluded this language
in the Code that governs federal judges. The CoDE OF CoNDUCT FOR UNITED STATES ]UDGES is reprinted in 175 F.RD.
364 (1998) and it does not i_nclude this portion of the ABA
Model Code. See discussion in, RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, LEGAL
ETI-HCS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBJLr!Y § 57-2 (ABA, West Croup, 2nd ed. 2002).
5 Pennsylvania senior state judge Isaac Garb from Bucks
County, in commenting on the White case discussed below, argued "judges shouldn't be muzzled," but he also
favored replacing judicial elections with merit selection.
In contrast, another senior judge, Carbon County Judge
John Lavelle, argued that judges should not have to "ingratiate themselves to the voting public." Voters should
instead rely on a "strong, scrutinizing press to do the
homework" about a judicial candidate's qualifications.
Charles Meredith, Judges Differ on Gag Rules for Candidates, ALLENTOWN (PENN.) MORNING C-\LL, June 5, 2002 at
Bl.

"(2) A candidate for appointment to judicial office
or a judge seeking other governmental office shall
not engage in political activity to secure the appointment except that:
''(a) such persons may:
"(i) communicate with the appointing authority, including any selection or nominating commission or
other agency designated to screen candidates;
"(ii) seek support or endorsement for the appoint-
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The question then is whether the First
Amendment (as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment) allows judges to
create rules that, in effect, try to take political
campaign speech out of political campaigns.
States, after all, can choose to appoint judges,
to have merit selection instead of elective campaigns. But, once the state chooses an election,
can it decide to restrict what the candidates
say? Can the state conclude that the voters
must decide among the candidates but that the
candidates may not tell the voters why they
should cast their votes?
The United States Supreme Court answered
that question in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White 6 In that case, a candidate for judicial office as well as various political groups including the Republican Party of Minnesota sued
state boards and offices who were responsible
for establishing and enforcing judicial ethics.
They alleged that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's canon of judicial conduct that prohibited candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues violated the First Amendment. The
U.S. Supreme Court agreed. In invalidating this
restriction on political speech during the course
of political campaigns, the Court emphasized
that this speech is core political speech and that
it will review with strict scrutiny any laws that
ban, restrict, or limit such speech.
Campaign speech is normally considered to
be well within the essence of the First Amendment. Yet, proponents of restricting such
speech typically argue that it is necessary toreform political campaigns by restricting speech
in order to "level the playing field" and end
corruption or the appearance of corruption. To
the extent that argument has merit, it should
be strongest in the case of judicial elections because judges are supposed to decide cases on
the basis of merit, not on the basis of interest
groups, pressure politics, and popular wilL
If that argument fails in the case of judicial
campaign speech-where any state interests in
regulating political speech should be at their
apex-then Republican Party v. White casts a
long shadow that should extend far beyond the
rules governing judicial elections 7 That case
applies the strict-scrutiny test with vigor, hold-

ROTUNDA

ing that those who seek to justify content-based
restriction of speech by candidates for public
office have the burden to prove that any restriction is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a
compelling state interest. 8
Oddly enough, the West headnote for White
on this point argues that there was only a plurality of Justice on this issue. 9 It seems clear
that it was a majority of the Court that held
that the proper test is strict scrutiny. The
Court opinion says that it is a majority opinion and lists the names of the five justices who
joined it. There were two concurring opinions, both labeled "concurring," and not
"concurring in part" or concurring in the result." Justice O'Connor, in her concurring
opinion makes clear that-"I join the opinion
of the Court. ... " 10 Justice Kennedy, the only
other concurring justice, also makes it quite
clear he understands that the Court uses strict
scrutiny in this case and that the majority
opinion explains "in clear and forceful terms
why the Minnesota regulatory scheme fails
that test." Right after that he adds, "So l
join its opinion." 11 In other words, he is
11

6
7

122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).
See, 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &

JoHN

E. NowAK,

TREATISE

ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: SuBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

§

20.51 (West Group, 3'd ed. 1999).
8 "The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper test to
be applied to determine the constitutionality of such are~
striction is what our cases have called strict scrutiny, id.,
at 864; the parties do not dispute that this is correct. Under the strict-scrutiny test, respondents have the burden
to prove that the announce clause is (1) narrowly ta~lored,
to serve (2) a compelling state interest. " 122 S.Ct. 2528,
2534.
9
"Under the strict-scrutiny test, party challenging content-based restriction of speech by candidates for public
office has the burden to prove that the restriction is (1)
narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest.
(Fer Justice Scalia, with three justices concurring and one
concurring in the result)." 122 S.Ct. at 2528, headnote [2].
See also, 122 S.Ct. at 2528, headnote [3]: "In order for party
challenging content-based restriction of speech by candidates for public office to show that restriction is narrowly
tailored under the strict scrutiny test, party must demonstrate that restriction does not unnecessarily circumscribe
protected expression. (Per Justice Scalia, with three justices
concurring and one concurring in the result.)" This headnote also incorrectly claims that there is no majority opinion. I have written West Publishing Company about this issue and it may be corrected in future printings.
10 122 S.Ct. at 2542.
ll 122 S.Ct. at 2544.

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, CAMPAIGN FINANCING, AND FREE SPEECH

joining the majority because it uses strict
scrutiny_l2
This use of strict scrutiny is controversial after Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PACJ 3
That case held that Buckley is authority for state
limits on campaign contributions and that the
$1000 limit does not have to be inflationadjusted. Instead, the question is whether the
contribution limit is "so low as to impede the
ability of candidates to 'amass the resources
necessary for effective advocacy.' " 14 The Court
in Shrink found no evidence that the state restriction had failed this forgiving test.
The White Court does not say that it is overruling Shrink Missouri, or any of its prior decisions. Yet, in Shrink Missouri, Justice Thomas'
dissent had specifically complained that the
majority there was abandoning strict scrutiny
in this line of cases, even though "Political
speech is the primary object of the First Amendment."15 Justice Breyer's concurrence in Shrink
Missouri notes the dissent's objection and responds that the "mechanical application" of the
tests associated with strict scrutiny are inappropriate in this line of cases 16 Later, thoughtful commentators concluded that Shrink Missouri had abandoned strict scrutiny.l7
Yet, the majority in White resurrects strict
scrutiny. In response the dissent is quite placid
and serene. Only Justice Ginsburg's dissent
cites Shrink Missouri, and she merely quotes
from a portion of Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion-not the part rejecting strict scrutinyfor the proposition that judges should avoid
prejudgment and not make pledges or
promises. 18
Now, let us first briefly summarize Republican Party v. White and then consider how some
of the arguments that proponents of campaign
restrictions advance might stack up in light of
the active, strict review in which the White
Court engaged.

THE WHITE DECISION AND SPEECH
ABOUT POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White arose
in Minnesota. The Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct, like the ABA Model Code of Judicial
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Conduct, places various limits on the candidates' speech when the state selects its judges
by election. One rule prohibits a judicial candidate or judge from making "pledges or
promises" on how he will rule in a particular
case 19 A second Minnesota rule of judicial
ethics prohibits a candidate for judicial office
from "announcing" a view on any "disputed
legal or political" issue if the issue might come
before a court 20 This clause prohibits a candidate's "mere statement" even if he "does not
bind himself to maintain that position after
election. " 21
The ABA Model Judicial Code does not have
the "announce" provision, but the Minnesota
state supreme court said that its "announce"
provision was intended to be similar to another
provision of the ABA Model Judicial Code that
prohibits judicial candidates from making
"statements that commit or appear to commit
the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the

12 One might read Kennedy's opinion as saying that he
agrees that the opinion of the Court has followed the strict
scrutiny test in a proper way, and that he joins that opinion in invalidating th(~ law. But, if he had his preferences,
he would apply an even stricter test than strict scrutiny;
he would apply a per se rule invalidating such campaign
restrictions. In the sentence following the one quoted in
the text, Justice Kennedy says: "I adhere to my view, however, that content-based speech restrictions that do not
fall within any traditional exception should be invalidated
without inquiry into narrow tailoring or compelling government interests." 122 S.Ct. at 2544.
13 528 u.s. 377 (2000).
14
582 U.S. at 397, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,

21.
15 528 U.S. at 410 (Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
dissenting).
16 528 U.S. at 911 (Justice Breyer, concurring, joined by
Justice Ginsburg).
17 Richard L Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance,
and "The Thing That Wouldn't Leave, 17 CONSTJTUTIONAL
COMMENTARY 483 (2000).
18 122 S.Ct. at 2555 (Justice Ginsburg, dissenting).
19 Minnesota
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
5A(3)(d)(il). The corresponding ABA provision is, ABA
MoDEL CooE OF )umcrAL CoNDUCT, Canon SA (d)(i).
20
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
5A(3)(d)(l), which states that judicial candidates may not
"make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office; announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues." (emphasis added).
2 1 122 S.Ct. at 2532.

82

court." 22 Minnesota claimed that its "announce" clause is really the same as the ABA
"commit or appear to commit" clause. Thus,
the Minnesota Supreme Court places limitations "upon the scope of the announce clause
that are not (to put it politely) immediately apparent from its text." 23 Nonetheless the U.S.
Supreme Court accepted this remarkable piece
of plastic surgery and proceeded to invalidate
this clause, even with the newly-discovered
limitations on its breadth.
In White, Justice Scalia, writing for five members of the Court, held that this second prohibition on judicial candidates violates the First
Amendment. In order for the announce clause to
be narrowly tailored, it must not '"mmecessarily
circumscrib[e] protected expression."' 24 The
Minnesota rule did not meet this test.
One common view of "impartiality" is no
bias for or against any party to the proceeding.
But the clause is not tailored to serve that interest because it does not restrict speech for or
against particular parties, but rather speech for
or against particular issues. "Impartiality" in
the sense of no preconception for or against a
particular legal view, is not a compelling state
interest, "since it is virtually impossible, and
hardly desirable, to find a judge who does not
have preconceptions about the law." 25 Indeed,
the Minnesota Constitution specifically requires judges to be "learned in the law." 26
Nor does the prohibition promote impartiality in the sense of "openmindedness" because
the announce clause is "woefully underinclusive.'m For example, a judge may confront a
legal issue on which he has expressed an opinion while on the bench. "Judges often state their
views on disputed legal issues outside the context of adjudication, in classes that they conduct, and in books and speeches. Like the ABA
Codes of Judicial Conduct, the Minnesota Code
not only permits but encourages this." T11e
Minnesota rule prohibits a judicial candidate
from saying, "! think it is constitutional for the
legislature to prohibit same-sex marriage." Yet
he may say the very same thing, until "the very
day before he declares himself a candidate, and
may say it repeatedly (until litigation is pending) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing
the objective of open-mindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so
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woefully underinclusive as to render belief in
that purpose a challenge to the credulous." 28
The Court, citing a non-judicial election case,
said what Minnesota may not do is to "censor
what the people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which candidate is most
likely to be an exemplary judicial officer. Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is the
right of the voters, not the State." 29
22

ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
5A(3)(d)(ii). The ABA, in the 1972 version of its Model
Code, had an "announce clause," but, because of First
Amend1nent concerns, dropped it and replaced it with the
/(appear to commit" language. See LISA MILORD, THE DEvnoP':\1ENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CoDE 50 (1992). Minnesota refused to adopt the ABA's new formulation, but
at oral argument contended that its "announce" clause
\vas really the same as the ABA provision it had specifically refused to adopt:

"At oral argument, respondents argued that the
limiting constructions placed upon Minnesota's announce clause by the Eighth Circuit, and adopted
by the Minnesota Supreme Court render the scope
of the clause no broader than the ABA's 1990 canon.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. This argument is somewhat curious because/ based on the same constitutional concerns that had motivated the ABA the Minnesota
Supreme Court was urged to replace the announce
clause with the new ABA language, but unlike
other jurisdictions, declined. Final Report of the Advisory Committee to Review the ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the 1\1innesota
Board on judicial Standards 5-6 (june 29, 1994),
reprinted at App. 367-368. The ABA, howt~ver,
agrees with respondents' position, Brief for ABA as
Amicus Curiae 5. We do not know whether the announce clause (as interpreted by state authorities)
and the 1990 ABA canon are one and the same. No
aspect of our constitutional analysis turns on this
question."
1

122 S.Ct. at 2534 n.5.
122 S.Ct. 2528, 2532.
24
122 S.Ct. at 2534-35, quoting Brown v. Hartlage/ 456
U.S. 45, 54, 102 S.Ct. 1523, 71 L.Ed.2d 732 (1982).
25 122 S.Ct. at 2536.
26
Minn. Const., Art. VI, § 5.
27 122 S.Ct. at 2537.
28 Id.
29
122 S.Ct. at 2545 (Kennedy,]., concurring), citing Brown
v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60, 102 S.Ct. 1523,71 L.Ed.2d 732
(J982). Justice O'Connor also filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Stevens, filed a dissenting opi.njon, in which Jus-tices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justice Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer, joined.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent argued: "In view of the magisterial role judges must fill in a system of justice, a role
~ha~ r_emoves them .from the partisan fray, States may limit
JUd1c_1al campaign speech by measures impermissible in
electiOns for political office." 122 S.Ct. at 2551.
23
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Now, let us consider a few recurring issues
involving campaign reform, in light of the strict
scrutiny the Court imposed in White.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE
First, let us turn to campaign contributions.
The White decision does not discuss this issue
directly, but its aggressive use of strict scrutiny
and its imposition of a heavy burden on the
proponents of campaign restrictions raise new
questions. White does not appear to allow proponents of restrictions on campaign expenditures and contributions to satisfy this burden
merely by asserting that contributions and expenditures raise an appearance of corruption
justifying state regulation.
When judges run for office, they need campaign funds. It is often asserted or assumed that
judicial campaign fundraising compromises
the impartiality of judges. One recent ABA poll,
for example, concluded that "72 percent of all
Americans are concerned that the impartiality
of judges is compromised by their need to raise
campaign contributions. More than half of the
respondents said they were 'extremely' or
'very' concerned." 30 This poll result alone is
enough, in the view of the ABA President, to
justify substantial changes in the law.
These poll results certainly raise serious concern, for an impartial judiciary is crucial to the
rule of law. Yet, do the polls reflect the way
things are in fact, or merely the way that many
people fear that they may be? The supposition
that contributions may corrupt the recipient is
not implausible, but what if it is false? As Justice Souter noted in Shrink Missouri, "This
Court has never accepted mere conjecture as
adequate to carry a First Amendment burden
. . . "3 1 If the people's fears are unreasonable, if
the empirical evidence does not support the
fear of corruption, then perhaps the remedy for
the fear should focus more on educating the
people.
One would think that the proposition that
contributions corrupt should be easy to examine as a statistical matter. While legislators or
members of the executive branch deal with
many issues and interest groups, judges deal
with specific parties involving particular mat-
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ters. Hence, if these parties (or their lawyers)
give the judges campaign contributions and the
judges then rule in favor of these parties (or
their lawyers), that does not necessarily mean
that judges are corrupt, but it does mean that
fear regarding the impartiality of judges merits study.
Unfortunately, there is not a great deal of rigorous empirical work in this area, but what exists is quite interesting and does not support a
statistical conclusion that judicial campaign
contributions are corrosive. One study has focused on the State of Illinois. Many of the people in that state are concerned that campaign
contributions affect judicial decisions. 32 Yet, the
empirical investigation dealing specifically
with this state undermines the voters concern.
Let us turn to that analysis.
Over the last three election cycles, 34% of the
cases that the Illinois Supreme Court decided
involved a case where either a party or the
lawyer was a campaign contributor 33 On the
30

ABA Journal E-report, August 16, 2002, www.
abanetorg/journal/ereport/ au16conf.html. This poll result is not atypicaL For example, a poll by the North Carolina Center for Voter Education showed that 84% of the
600 likely voters surveyed "are concerned about how
judges raise money for their elections." Campaign contributions "influence judicial decisions," said 74 percent,
even though 81%, still ~~preferred the election of judges
over appointment." J. Barlow Herget, Op-ed, It's Time for
judicial Reform! CHARL01TE (N.C.) OBSERVER, May 3t 2002.
www .charlotte.com/ mld/ observer I news/3369889 .htm.
31
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 397 (2000).
32 A recent poll showed that more than 85 percent of Illinois voters are concerned that political contributions influence the decisions of judges. Steve Neal, State Needs

Fairer Way to Pick Judges, Chicago Sun-Times, September
4, 2002.
33

See Samantha Sanchez, Illinois Supreme Court: 1\1oney
in Judicia! Elections, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MoNEY
IN STATE PoLiTICS, www.followthemoney.org/reports/il/
20020129 /lL.phtm!.
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MoNEY IN STATE PouTJCS developed the Money in Judicial Polil:ics Project to track contributions and spending in Supreme Court elections in a
number of states, including Illinois. To compile a complete campaign profile of the court that included at least
one election for each of the seven sitting Justices, the Project collected data for three election cycles·. -1990, 1992 and
1994. In these election cycles, 32 candidates sought one of
the seven positions. 'Ihis study did not include the
supreme court races of 2000, in which 12 candidates spent
$7.7 million, because those elected had not yet partici~
pated in enough cases to make the process of matching
contributors and litigants worthwhile.
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other hand, the vast majority of campaign contributors "had no cases before the Court, and
most litigants who appeared before the state
supreme court had not made any campaign
contributions. 34 "
When we look more closely at the cases
where a party or lawyer was a contributor,
there is less there than meets the eye. Between
1991 and 1999,34% of the cases that the Illinois
Supreme Court heard involved a party, lawyer
or organization that made a campaign contribution to a Supreme Court justice in 1990 or
1992, but more than two-thirds of those cases
involve public attorneys representing the state.
The state's lawyers were giving contributions,
but they do not have the same interest in litigation as private lawyers. The state's prosecutors do not work on contingent fees; they do
not worry about losing their client 35 Indeed,
they should not even worry about losing their
cases if they lose for the right reason: "The duty
of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely
to convict." 36 The sovereign wins whenever
justice is done 37
Fewer than 4% of the lawyers who appeared
before the Supreme Court made a contribution
to a winning candidate, and one-third of the judicial campaign funds came from an unlikely
source of corruption: the candidates themselves or from the political parties who backed
the candidates 38 Assuming that the party is not
fum<eling campaign contributions from donors
to the particular candidate-assuming, in
short, that the party is not "laundering" the
contributions but is merely spending money it
collects from a great number of individual contributors, then the concept that the political
party can "corrupt" the views of its candidates
is peculiar, because the candidates are its candidates.39
Let us look specifically as to whether major
contributors who had cases before the Illinois
Supreme Court were more likely to win. The
average contribution was only $645, but there
were 68 contributors who gave $5,000 or more
in the three election cycles that this study investigated. Of these major contributors, only
seven out of the 68 even appeared before the
Court, and these seven lost as many cases as
they had won. 40
Of course, the fact that there is no statistical
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correlation between the major contributors to
the campaigns of justices of the Illinois
Supre1ne Court and success before that courtthe fact that major contributors were just as

34

The funds contributed by all parties appearing before
the Illinois Supreme Court amounted to only 40% of the
amount that candidates themselves had contributed to
their own campaigns from their personal funds. These
contributor-litigants gave 6.6% of the money that the candidates raised.
Remember, that the "vast majority of campaign contributors have no cases before the Court." www.followthemoney.org/reports/il/20020129 /IL.phtml.
35 See www.followthemoney.org/reports/il/20020129 I
IL.phtml: "If the publicly employed attorneys are removed from consideration, on the theory that their success before the Court is unlikely to be related to their contributions, just J 0.7 percent of cases before the Supreme
Court involved a contributor. When those contributors
appeared before the Court, they were more often on the
losing side than the wiruting side of the case."
36 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTICE, Standard 3-1.2(c), "The Function of the Prosecutor," (ABA 3"' ed. Feb. 3, 1992).
37 RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, LEGAL ETHics: THE LAWYER's DEsKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 12-4 (ABA-West
Group 2nd ed. 2002).
38
See www.followtllemoney.org/reports/il/20020129 /IL.
phtml.
11te Court has rejected restrictions on campaign financing when an anti-corruption rationale is unlikely to
exist. See, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 45-47 (1976) (per
curiam) (invalidating limits on independent expenditures
because the "advocacy restricted by the provision does
not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent
corruption"); Federal Election Commission v. MCFL, 479
U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (striking limits on campaign expenditures by incorporated political associations because
spending by such groups "does not pose [any] threat" of
corruption); Federal Election Commission v. NCPAC, 470
U.S. 480 (1985) (invalidating limits on independent expenditures by political action committees because, in that
context, "a quid pro quo for improper commitments" was
only a "hypothetical possibility"); Citizens Against Rent
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290, 297 (1981) (reaffirming that "Buckley does not support limitations on contributions to committees formed to
favor or oppose ballot measures " because an anticorruption rationale is inapplicable); First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (holding that
limits on referendum speech by corporations violate First
Amendment because "[t]he risk of corruption ... simply
is not present").
39
Cf., Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604, 646-47
(1996) [Colorado I], holding that First Amendment prohibits application of Federal Election Campaign Act's
party expenditure provision to expenditures that political party has made independently, without coordination
with any candidate. A separate opinion of Justice Thomas,
joined as to this part by Chief Justice Relmquist and Jus-
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likely to lose cases before these justices41 -does
not prove that the contributions were not corruptive. Perhaps, if the contributors had given
less, they would have lost even more than half
of their cases. Still, the statistical evidence is
still relevant because it does demonstrate in
this state there is no statistical evidence supporting the assertion of corruption. Yet, that assertion is often repeated as if it had the certainty
of a law of physics, just as the night follows the
day.
More recently, the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin reported that the "Illinois Supreme Court
is not as friendly a venue for plaintiffs as many
believe: plaintiffs lost in nearly two-thirds of
the tort cases the justices have decided since
February 2001." Chief Justice Moses W. Harrison, considered "the court's staunchest ally of
the plaintiffs," said, "We're a pretty conservative court [in tort cases], as far as I'm concerned." The Bulletin concluded that there ap-

pears to be no correlation between campaign
contributions from plaintiffs' lawyers and favoritism to plaintiffs. Some of the contributors
may not be happy with this state of affairs, but
that only means that the fact that people may
want to buy influence does not mean that they
are successful. Chicago personal-injury attorney Joseph A. Power Jr.-whose law firm and
its partners have contributed $63,000 to Illinois
Supreme Court candidates in the year 2000said that the court's record, in his view, was
"very disturbing." He added: "Had I known
ahead of time that the candidates were going
to take two-thirds of the cases and decide them
in favor of [the defense], I would have donated
the money to a good charity 42
There is a similar thorough study of the
Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. It also
covered a complete campaign profile of the
state supreme court that included at least one
election for each of the sitting justices. The in-

tice Scalia, also concluded that the anticorruption rationale justifying campaign restrictions is inapplicable in the
context of political parties funding campaigns because
there is only a minimal threat o£ corruption when a party
spends to support its candidate or to oppose the competitor to its candidate, whether or not that expenditure
is made in concert with the candidate. Jd. at 631.
Colorado I then remanded for the lower court to consider the political party's broad claim that all limits on a
party's congressional campaign expenditures are unconstitutional on their face, and thus unenforceable even as
to spending coordinated with a candidate. The district
court and the Tenth Circuit agreed with this First Amendment challenge, but the Supreme Court reversed, in FEC
v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee,
533 U.S. 421 (2001) [Colorado II]. The Court rejected this
facial challenge to the restriction. "We hold that a party's
coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention
of contribution limits." 533 U.S. at 465.
The IThtjority's analysis places an important caveat on
the anticorruption rationale. The majority was concerned
that if it gave a party the right to make unlimited coordinated expenditures, that would encourage those people wishing to support a nominee to contribute to that
party (to, in effect, launder their contribution) in order to
finance coordinated spending for the candidate, thus circumventing the contribution limits. The majority found
that the evidence supported this risk, thus entitling the
government to prevail in its characterization of party coordinated spending as the functional equivalent of contri-

butians. For example, while the party claimed that many
of the contributions to it were small, the evidence showed
substantial individual· donations with the party acting as
a matchmaker.
It is important to realize that, as the majority pointed
out "all members of the Court agree that circumvention
is a valid theory of corruption; the remaining bone of contention is evidentiary." 533 U.S. at 456 (footnote omitted).
As a matter of the evidence in that case, the Court was
unwilling to invalidate the campaign restriction. This
need to look at the empirical evidence should also exist
in the case of judicial campaign contributions.
40 See www.followthemoney.org/reports/il/20020129/IL.

rhtml

1 The private attorneys who contributed to at least one
member of the Illinois Supreme Court and later appeared
before that court, in order of funds contributed, are:
Jerome Mirza, who gave $11,264, appeared in three cases
and lost all three; Robert A. Clifford, who gave $9,500, appeared in two cases and lost both; Leonard M. Ring, who
gave $7,750, appeared in tvvo cases, lost one and received
a split decision in the second; Philip H. Carboy, who gave
$4A50, appeared in three cases, lost one and had two split
decisions; Joseph Curcio, who gave $4,100 and appeared
in one case which he won; and, Patrick A. Salvi who gave
$3,030 and appeared in only one case, filing an amicus
brief. Amiel Stephen Cueto gave $3,000 and appeared in
one case, which he lost. And 66 other attorneys who gave
less than $3,000 each and had similar mixed results.
42 Daniel C. Vock, Dem Majority Aside, High Court Learns
Right, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, September 3, 2002.
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vestigators collected data for an eight-year period, 1990 to 1998 43 The conclusions are comparable.
During this eight-year period covering five
election cycles, 89 percent of the cases that the
Michigan Supreme Court decided involved a
contributor who was either a party or an attorney. Yet, when we look more closely, we
find that more than half of those cases involved
a state-employed attorney who had made a
campaign contribution and who was representing the state, not a private client, before the
court. 44 Lawyers constituted 23% of the contributors, but at least 80% of these lawyers
never appeared before the court during the entire time of the study. In Michigan, the judicial
candidates contributed only 2%, of the total
funds raised.
Once again, there is no statistical linkage be··
tween contributions and outcomes favorable to
those who gave the contributions. For example,
one law firm that had contributed the most to
judicial candidates over the five election cycles
gave a total of $344,403, from the firm and 53
individual attorneys. However, only $41,735
(12 percent) of that went to winning candidates
who then became Supreme Court justices and
the nine lawyers from that firm who actually
argued cases before the Court gave just $4,532
to members of the Court. The law firm was involved in 23 cases during that period, four of
them by filing an amicus brief. Of the remaining 19 cases, they won three, lost four times as
many (that is, 12) and got split decisions in
four. 45
A similar study covers the State of Wisconsin. This study also examined a lengthy period
covering several election cycles, and its results
are similar to those for Illinois and Michigan.
For example, during a 10-year period under review, tl1cre were 95 cases involving attorney
discipline. Nine of these cases involved attorneys who had contributed to the justices, and
in all nine of these cases, the lawyers lost their
appeals. One law firm with only eight lawyers
was one of the largest contributors in the state.
It contributed a total of $8,150 to six Justices.
That firm argued seven cases before the court,
winning only two and losing five. As the study
concludes, "while the practice of giving money
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to judicial candidates clearly raises questions of
potential bias, the data does [sic] not support
such an inference." 46
One robin does not make a spring, and these
statistics from three major states may not necessarily represent what we might find in other
jurisdictions. In addition, cases that go before
appellate courts are often complex, so that it
may be difficult to determine if a decision is a
complete victory for any party. The plaintiff
may win, but the ruling of law may not be exactly what plaintiff desired and might come
back to haunt plaintiff (particularly if plaintiff
is an institutional litigant often before a court,
like a union ur a major corporation). In addition, even if a contributor wins a case, one can
argue that he or she might have won anyway,
so that the contribution was superfluous.
Nonetheless, these statistical studies do show
that charges of corruption can only be proven
by looking at specific situations and motivations, not by painting with a broad brush and
assuming that there is a tit for tat between campaign contributions and judicial decisions and
that therefore laws restricting campaign contributions are necessary because corruption is
inevitable.

43

Samantha Sanchez, 11li11ois Supreme Court.· Money in Ju-

dicial £/ecfions,

THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN

www.followthemoney.org/reports/mi/
20020129 /MLphtml. "Databases were created of all campaign contributions to all winning candidates during the
study period, and those contributors' names were
matched against a database of the parties and attorneys
whose cases were heard by the Supreme Court from 1991
through 1999. During that time, 26 candidates sought one
of the seven positions, several of them more than once,
and raised a total of $9,536,710. The 2000 Supreme Court
races, where nine candidates spent a total of $6,352,002 in
just one election, are not included in this study because
those elected have not yet participated in enough cases to
make the process of matching contributors and litigants
worthwhile."
4
·~ See
www.followthemoney.orglreportslmil20020129 I
Ml.phtml.
45
See www .followthemoney.orglreports/mi 120020129 I
Ml.phtml.
46 Samantha Sanchez, Campaign Contribulions and the Wisconsin Supreme Court-, THE NATlONAL INSTITUTE ON Mol\.'EY
lN STATE Pouncs, May 9, 2001, www.followthemoney.
org/ reports I wi I 20010509 /WI. phtml.
STATE PoullCS,
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JUDGES APPOINTING LAWYERS WHO
HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORS
There is an inherent difficulty in separating
campaign contributions that are corrupt from
campaign contributions that are perfectly proper,
because the distinction is based on the motive of
both fhe donor and recipient. One must look at
motive with fhe precision of a surgeon's scalpel,
not a butcher's meat axe.
So too must one deal with precision if there
is a suspicion that the judge is rewarding a
donor with a plumb judicial appointment
instead of a favorable ruling. Judges, for example, may appoint a lawyer as a referee,
commissioner, special master, receiver, or
guardians, and may ·appoint relatives of a
lawyer as a clerk, secretary or bailiff. In 1999,
the ABA focused on this problem when it
added a new provision to its Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The new Canon 3C(5) provides:
A judge shall not appoint a lawyer to a
position if the judge either knows that
the lawyer has contributed more than
[$ _] 4 7 within the prior [_] 48 years to
the judge's election campaign, or learns of
such a contribution by means of a timely
motion by a party or other person properly interested in the matter, unless
(a) the position is substantially uncompensated;
(b) the lawyer has been selected in rotation from a list of qualified and available
lawyers compiled without regard to fheir
having made political contributions; or
c) the judge or another presiding or administrative judge affirmatively finds
that no other lawyer is willing, competent and able to accept the position. 49

or lawyer made or solicited the political contribution "for the purpose of obtaining or being
considered for that type of legal engagement or
appointment." 51 When bar disciplinary counsel
objected that the new rule, given its motivation
component, would be difficult to enforce, the
proponents basically agreed and argued that it
was only intended to be enforced in "extreme
circumstances." Otherwise, it was supposed to
be "largely self-enforcing. " 52
The new judicial rule, like its corresponding
rule in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, reflects the concern that some people
have about the appearance of impropriety if
lawyers make a political contribution to the
judge, and the judge then rewards (or appears
to reward) those lawyers by appointing them
as special masters, guardians, receivers, or similar positions. Canon 3C(5) provides, in general, that a judge should not appoint a lawyer
to a particular position if the judge learns or
knows that the appointee has contributed more
than a certain amount (the local jurisdiction
sets the amount that triggers this prohibition)
within a certain period of years (the local jurisdiction also sets the relevant time period). To
some extent it reaffirms a more general provision, Canon 3C(4), that instructs judges to exercise their power of appointment on the basis
of merit and not on the basis of nepotism 5 3
Thus, Supruance v. Commission on f udicial
Qualifications 54 held that a judge violated
Canon 3C(4) when he appointed friends and

47

Each jurisdiction adopting this provision is supposed
to insert its own specific dollar amount.
rl.S Similarly, each jurisdiction adopting this provision is
supposed to pick a number of years to insert.
49 RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, LECAL ETHics, TnE LAWYER's DEsKnooK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBlL!TY

(ABA-West Group,

This section corresponds to Rule 7.6 of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, dealing with lawyers' efforts to make political contributions in order to obtain government
legal engagements or appointments by judges.
Rule 7.6 also does not paint with a broad brush
but instead only prohibits law firms or lawyers
from accepting a government legal engagement
or an appointment from a judge if the law firm

5°

znd

§ 60-1_5

at

p. 859

ed. 2002) .

.so ABA MoDEL Rt.::LES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT, Rule 7.6,
"Political Contributions to Obtain Government Legal Engagements or Appointments by Judges."
:>l ABA MoDEL RuLE 7.6 (emphasis added).
52 House of Delegates Debate of Feb. 12, 2000, quoted in
ABA/BNA LAWYH<.'s MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
Current Reports, voL 16, at 64 (Mar. ·t 2000); Report of
the ABA Section of Business Law and other Sections, Report- with Recommendations to the House of Delegates, Nov.
23, 1999, at 10.
53 ABA MoDEL CoDE OF JumciAL CoNDUCT, Canon 3C(4).
5413 Cal.3d 778, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841, 532 P.2d 1209 (1975).
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political supporters to represent indigent defendants in criminal cases. The problem was
the judge did not appoint on the basis of merit.
Note the necessity of proving that the judge appointed for the wrong reason. Once again, the
court recognized the need to show corrupt motive, just as federal bribery laws require a quid
pro quo. Indeed, in one decision a divided court
refused to censure a judge who had appointed
his lover as chief cashier, because the lover was
"well qualified for the appointment."5 5
Thus, even the simple prohibition of Canon
3C(5) recognizes the need for exceptions,
where the appearance of impropriety is notreally realistic. For example, if the appointed position is substantially uncompensated, there is
no real risk that the judge is favoring a political contributor, for the simple reason that one
is not "favored" by being appointed to a job
that pays nothing or very little. Similarly,
there is no appearance of impropriety if the
appointee is selected by rotation from a list
created without regard to one having made
political contributions. Nor does this rule apply if the judge affirmatively finds that no
other lawyer is willing, competent and able to
accept the position.

JUDGES MAKING PROMISES
Recall that Minnesota argued that a judicial
candidate should not "announce" his or her
views in order to preserve the judge's "openmindedness," an argument that the Supreme
Court found "woefully" inadequate." 56 It was
not enough for Minnesota to assert this interest. It had to prove it. While the Court found
that Minnesota presented no empirical evidence and that its assertions were mere conjecture,57 there are illustrations in history that
do exist, and those examples undercut Minnesota's claim.
As Professor Alexander Bickel once remarked, when a President appoints a Justice,
he shoots "an arrow into a far-distant future
[and] not the man himself can tell you what he
will think about some of the problems that he
will face." 58 This simple fact is illustrated by no
less a judicial titan than Judge Henry Friendly,

a great judge and prolific author. In one case,
when one of the parties cited to him one of his
own articles indicating how an issue should be
decided, Judge Friendly decided that he disagreed with what he himself had earlier written; the genius of the common law system, he
recognized, is that judges must make the decisions in the context of concrete cases, not in the
context of law review articles. Judge Friendly
dissented,59 while the majority relied upon
Friendly's law review artic!e 60
Judge Friendly did not know how he would
rule on the legal issue until he had to decide
the legal issue, even though the Judge had
thought about the problem and had written an
article a bout it coming to a firm conclusion, a
conclusion that he later rejected.
TI1is instance is no judicial orphan. For example, Justice Jackson participated in the decision of one case that raised an issue on which
he had earlier written an opinion as Attorney
General. Jackson concurred in the opinion of
the Court even though it was contrary to his
opinion as Attorney GeneraJ 61 He recognized
his shift of views and quoted Lord Westbury
who had earlier stated (when his Lordship repudiated one of his previous opinions): "I can
only say that I am amazed that a man of my
intelligence should have been guilty of giving
such an opinion. "62

55

Matter of Delessandro, 483 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743, 759
(1979) (per curiam).
56 Jd.
57 122 S.Ct. at 2437038.
58 Judgment on a Justice, TIME, May 23, 1969, at 23-24 (quoting Alexander Bickel).
59 Williams v. Adams, 436 P.2d 30, 35 (2nd Cir. 1970)
(Friendly, J., dissenting). Judge Friendly (the judge, not
the author) was vindicated v.rhen the Second Circuit, en
bane, reversed the panel decision, in 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.
1971) (per curiam). But the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
with Henry Friendly, the author, and not Henry Friendly,
the judge, and it reversed the Second Circuit. Adams v.
Williams,407 U.S. 143,92 S.Ct. 1921,32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
60 Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 34 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1970),
quoting, Henry Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 952 (1965).
61
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, (1950). Compare
340 U.S. at 176, 71 S.Ct. at 233, with 39 Op.Atty.Gen. 504
(1940).
62
340 U.S. at 178, 71 S.Ct. at 233.
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Over a century earlier, Justice Story, explaining his rejection of his own former opinion, responded as follows: "My own error,
however, can furnish no ground for its being
adopted by this Court ... " 63 Judges can change
their mind, and the genius of the common law
system recognizes that statements or principles
announced in general may be inapplicable in
light of the specific facts of a case.
So too in the ca>e of general campaign reform
involving free speech issues, the methodology
of the White case indicates that proponents of restrictions will have to back up their assertions
with examples and empirical studies.

The White decision and its rationale suggest
that the Court will be wary of campaign reform
legislation that is disguised as incumbent protection legislation. To the extent that campaigning and electioneering become regulated
industries, the Court is signaling that it will not
grant the deference to these regulators that it
grants in situations not implicating the First
Amendment. White, in short, casts a net that
will catch far more than overly-restrictive judicial campaign restrictions. White may be a harbinger of what is to come in any challenges to
other laws or proposals that restrict free speech
in the context of political campaigns.

CAMPAIGN RESTRICTIONS
AS INCUMBENT
PROTECTION LEGISLATION

CONCLUSION

During the oral argument before the
Supreme Court in the White case, the justices
revealed their concern that the judicial restrictions at issue appeared to be designed to protect incumbent judges from criticism from their
challengers. The restrictions on what judicial
candidates could say in the course of a political campaign did not, of course, apply to incumbent judges when writing their majority
opinions, or concurrences or dissents. They
could say whatever they wanted in terms of
criticizing their colleagues, explaining how
they would have ruled, why their view is correct, and so forth. The Minnesota rule restricting judicial campaign speech did not apply to
dictum, even when judges knew that newspapers would likely quote that dictum.
As one justice, in oral argument, said:

And what we end up with at the end of
the day is a system where an incumbent
judge can express views in written opinions, and perhaps otherwise, as well, and
yet a candidate for that office is somehow
restricted from discussing the very same
thing in the election campaign. That's kind
of an odd system, designed to what?
Maintain incumbent judges, or what? 64

The First Amendment (as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment)
does not allow judges to impose restrictive
rules that take political campaign speech out of
political campaigns. If states choose to elect
judges instead of appointing them, that choice
limits the subsequent power of the state to regulate the judicial elections.
White may lead states to reconsider the election of judges and move more to the federal
model of merit selection. But the effect of White
goes beyond that, for the majority opinion
adopts a template for analysis of campaign
laws that restrict speech-and that template
imposes a heavy burden on advancing the restriction.
Judicial campaign speech is different from
campaign speech of members of the legislative
and executive branches, because judges are
supposed to decide cases based on the law and
the facts, not based on what is popular at the
moment. Politicians are supposed to be responsive to the public will, but judges are not
supposed to be politicians.

63

United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 478,
6 L.Ed. 693 (1827).
64 Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 2002 WL
492692, 70 USLW 3612, U.S. Oral Argument, Mar 26,2002,
transcript at pp. 34-35.
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Yet, even in the case of judicial campaign
speech, the Court imposes a heavy burden on
those who place barriers and restrictions. If that
burden is heavy and difficult to surmount in
that case, then a fortiori it is exceedingly difficult to surmount in the case of non-judicial
campmgns.
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